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Pendent Jurisdiction Over Claims
Arising Under Federal Law
By WILLIAM H. THEIS*
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has received increasing
attention from the federal courts in recent years. The majority of
cases in which the doctrine has been applied involve claims arising
under state law. State law claims not independently within a
court's subject matter jurisdiction have entered the federal courts
as "pendent" claims if sufficiently related to a claim within the
federal court's subject matter jurisdiction.1
Although receiving far less attention, a limited number of
claims arising under federal law have also entered the federal
courts through a variation of the pendent jurisdiction theory.2
That this mutation of pendent jurisdiction should exist may strike
some as surprising and unnecessary. Although one may expect fed-
eral claims to have ready access to the federal courts, technical re-
quirements on occasion bar a federal claim from a particular fed-
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago. A.B., 1967, Loyola Univer-
sity of Chicago; J.D., 1970, Northwestern University; L.L.M., 1977, Columbia University.
The author acknowledges the assistance of Professor Richard A. Michael of Loyola Univer-
sity and Professor John L. Sobieski, Jr. of the University of Tennessee for reading and
commenting on this Article.
1. See generally Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 33 U. PrrT. L. REv. 759 (1971); Bratton, Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity
Cases, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 296 (1974); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of
Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963); Garvey, The Limits of Ancillary Juris-
diction, 57 Tax. L. REv. 697 (1979); Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Re-
vised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. Rav. 245 (1980); Shakman, The New
Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. Rzv. 262 (1968); Shulman & Jae-
german, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393 (1936);
Sullivan, Pendent Jurisdiction: The Impact of Hagans and Moor, 7 IND. L. REv. 925 (1974);
Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 62 COLUM. L. Rv. 1018 (1962); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81
H~Av. L. REv. 657 (1968); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Syn-
thesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 1263 (1975).
2. See generally Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 73 HARv. L. REv. 817 (1960).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
eral court. The Supreme Court has given limited approval to the
use of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as a means of access to
the federal courts in some instances. The Court has not elaborated
adequately, however, upon the full reach of this doctrine in these
special cases. As a result, the decisions in this area have left the
lower courts with insufficient guidance. The lower courts have gen-
erally reached commendable results. Nevertheless, the plasticity of
the doctrine holds out false prospects for litigants and carries a
potential for serious distortion unless the doctrine is applied in a
considered and deliberate fashion that is attentive to its limiting
factors.
This Article attempts to set forth a principled approach to the
application of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine to federal claims.
The Article first traces the development of the doctrine in cases
involving state law claims, emphasizing judicial trends that can be
extrapolated from recent decisions. The Article next examines the
use of pendent jurisdiction to circumvent jurisdictional and proce-
dural restrictions imposed on the power of the federal courts to
adjudicate federal claims. The Article concludes that the judicial
extension of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to claims arising
under federal law is largely an unwarranted burden on the limited
judicial resources of the federal courts and an unauthorized abro-
gation of congressional intent to limit the jurisdictional power of
these courts.
Pendent Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims
Although the courts have declared that the principles gov-
erning pendent jurisdiction over state law claims are not the same
as those involving pendent jurisdiction over federal claims,3 com-
parisons between the two are useful. The cases involving state law
claims have exhibited an increasing concern that the judicial doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction not conflict with the statutes confer-
ring jurisdictional power on the federal courts. This theme has spe-
cial importance for the application of pendent jurisdiction over
federal claims.
3. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81
(1959).
[Vol. 32
JURISDICTIONS OVER CLAIMS
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs
The contours of the modern pendent jurisdiction doctrine
were set forth by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs.' The plaintiff in Gibbs alleged a violation of federal labor
relations law, claiming the defendant had conducted an illegal sec-
ondary boycott. A count under state law, alleging a civil conspiracy
and a boycott illegal at common law, was appended to the federal
claim.
Although the parties were not of diverse citizenship, the Su-
preme Court approved the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the
state law claim. The Court held that, once a federal court has juris-
diction over a substantial claim 5 arising under federal law, it also
has the power to decide a plaintiff's related state law claims that
arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts.0 If a plaintiff nor-
mally would be expected to try these claims together, the federal
court may assert jurisdiction over all of them;7 convenience and
fairness to the parties as well as considerations of judicial economy
militate against dividing the plaintiff's claims for separate treat-
ment by federal and state courts.8 Because the plaintiff could have
avoided these results by suing on both claims in state court, the
Court implicitly encouraged resort to federal courts on federal law
claims, even when, as in Gibbs, the federal jurisdiction was not
exclusive.
Although a federal court has jurisdiction over pendent claims,
Gibbs stressed that discretion must be exercised in determining
whether or not to assert pendent jurisdiction. Wise discretion,
counseled Gibbs, should forego the use of jurisdictional power in
4. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). An earlier and narrower treatment of pendent jurisdiction by
the Court appeared in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
5. For a classic statement of what constitutes a "substantial" federal claim, see Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). See also Seid, The Tail Wags the Dog: Hagans v. Lavine and
Pendent Jurisdiction, 53 J. Uis. L. 1, 8-16 (1975).
6. 383 U.S. at 725.
7. One commentator has suggested that a plaintiff may join claims that would be ex-
pected to merit joint trial even if they do not meet the common nucleus test. Baker, Toward
a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 759,
764-65 (1971). This suggestion does not seem to have received approval in later cases.
8. Although the Court found the exercise of pendent jurisdiction "particularly appro-
priate" when federal law may preempt the application of state law, 383 U.S. at 729, it did
not rule that a possible preemption issue was a necessary condition for the exercise of pen-
dent jurisdiction.
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some instances.9 If the federal claims are disposed of early in the
litigation or if the issues are so complicated that separate trials of
federal and state issues might be required, the state claims should
be dismissed without prejudice. The complexity or uncertainty of
state law might also warrant a discretionary dismissal, without
prejudice, of state law claims. Gibbs cautioned in general against
excessive intrusion by a federal court into issues of state law unless
it must decide substantial federal issues to which issues of state
law are an appendage.
An analysis of Gibbs raises three unresolved questions: (1)
what authority grants the federal courts power to exercise pendent
jurisdiction; (2) what relationship exists between theories of pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction; and (3) what consequences should
attach to a violation of the Gibbs guidelines. All three questions
have pertinence for an analysis of the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion over federal claims.
The Authority of the Federal Courts to Exercise Pendent
Jurisdiction
The opinion in Gibbs stressed the desirability of allowing the
federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law
claims, but provided little analysis for the propriety of the doc-
trine's existence. Because Congress, and not the Supreme Court,
establishes the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,10
one might expect the Court to offer evidence of congressional ap-
proval for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. To establish that
the Court may exercise pendent jurisdiction, consistent with the
Constitution," avoids the jurisdictional question whether Congress
has authorized such an exercise of judicial power. It might be rea-
soned that the two claims constitute a single "civil action," the ju-
risdictional phrase found in 28 U.S.C. section 1331.12 Gibbs did not
9. Id. at 726-27.
10. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
11. "Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a
claim 'arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority. . .,' U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the rela-
tionship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire ac-
tion before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.'" 383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis by
the Court).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
[Vol. 32
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make this conclusion explicitly, and perhaps the Court was mind-
ful of the potential problems that might have arisen had it done so.
If pressed alone, the state law claim surely would be a "civil ac-
tion," but one neither arising under federal law nor asserted by one
diverse citizen against another. Congress intended this type of
claim to be heard in state court. It seems anomolous that a claim
might be a "civil action" or only part of a "civil action," and conse-
quently fall without or within the court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion, as the pleader may declare.
Probably for this reason, the Court avoided a rigorous analysis
of "civil action" and stressed the general policies of convenience,
efficiency, and fairness to the parties that are embodied in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow a liberal joinder of
claims as well as other liberal procedural devices.1 s Because Con-
gress has a veto power over the Rules, 14 it has, in a limited sense,
approved the policies behind the Rules. Therefore, it could be ar-
gued that, even though Congress intended state court resolution of
nondiverse state law claims as the normal course of events, Con-
gress also intended that a federal court resolve state law claims in
a federal case if the goals behind the Rules thereby would be ad-
vanced.1 5 The Court's analysis, however, was not so extended.16
Only in later cases has the Court made a more exacting inquiry
into congressional intent.1 '
the United States. ... "
13. 383 U.S. at 724.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
15. The Court made no mention of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) which, according to the Re-
viser's Note, codified the Court's earlier decision on pendent jurisdiction, Hum v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238 (1933). Perhaps, if the statute approved Hum's narrow interpretation of the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, Gibbs flouted the will of Congress when it broadened the
Hum test. On the other hand, the statute's "related claim" language might have signified an
enlarging of the Hum test. If so, the statute's grant of pendent jurisdiction in patent, copy-
right, and trademark cases may have indicated an intent that the pendent jurisdiction not
be extended to other classes of cases. The Court's failure to consider these issues is espe-
cially intriguing in light of its later statements that it may not tamper with the judicial gloss
placed upon a statute when Congress has implicitly approved that gloss. See notes 44, 61-63
& accompanying text infra.
16. "While it is commonplace that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expand
the jurisdiction of federal courts, they do embody 'the whole tendency of our decisions...
to require a plaintiff to try his... whole case at one time,'.., and to that extent empha-
size the basis of pendent jurisdiction." 383 U.S. at 725 n.13.
17. See notes 40-67 & accompanying text infra.
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The Relationship Between Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Gibbs also failed to clarify the circumstances under which a
federal court may assert jurisdiction over a related state law claim
not asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant. Earlier deci-
sions had approved "ancillary" jurisdiction 18 over state law claims
arising out of the transaction that formed the original basis of the
action.1 9 Ancillary jurisdiction has extended to compulsory coun-
terclaims, 0 intervention," impleader, 2 and class actions.2 For
purposes of ancillary jurisdiction, the meaning of "transaction" de-
pends not on an immediate connection of occurrences, but on the
"logical relationship" between the claims.24 The ancillary jurisdic-
tion cases illustrate that the logical relationship test may be more
18. For a more complete discussion of ancillary jurisdiction, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
Mnsxn & E. CooPER, FnDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURz § 3523, at 56-73 (1975); Fraser,
Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Court, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963);
Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. Rxv. 395
(1976).
19. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
20. See, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926). Permis-
sive counterclaims, unless in the nature of a set-off, require independent jurisdictional
grounds. C. WRoIHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Fiawa CouRS § 80, at 394 & n.59 (3d ed.
1976). For contrary views on the permissive counterclaim issue, see United States ex rel.
D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1087-89 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Green, Federal Jurisdiction
over Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 271 (1953).
21. See, e.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922);
Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
22. See, e.g., United States v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 792 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973); Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1971); H.L.
Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967); Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393
(6th Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1962);
Southern Milling Co. v. United States, 270 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1959); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d
804 (2nd Cir. 1959); Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great N. Ry., 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953).
As long as the original claim is within the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the third-
party claim need not meet original subject matter jurisdiction requirements. Once a third-
party defendant is impleaded, however, the original plaintiff must meet the jurisdictional
requisites if he or she desires to assert a claim against the third-party defendant. Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). On the other hand, a third-party
defendant desirous of asserting a claim against the original plaintiff may use ancillary juris-
diction to dispense with normal jurisdictional requisites. See Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970); 59 Ky. L.J. 506 (1970); 49 N.C.L. Rzv.
503 (1971).. For further discussion of these issues, see Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction in Third-
Party Practice-Rule 14, 51 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 354 (1956); Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary
Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. Rzv. 265 (1971).
23. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
24. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
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inclusive than Gibbs' common nucleus test.25 Further, ancillary ju-
risdiction has not been limited to federal question cases. Diversity
cases have often provided an independent basis for ancillary
claims."8 The same policies identified in Gibbs that support the ex-
ercise of pendent jurisdiction are present in the ancillary jurisdic-
tion cases, and the Court did not seem to disapprove those cases.17
However, by establishing a common nucleus test and making no
effort to integrate it with the previous law, Gibbs left open two
possibilities: (1) ancillary jurisdiction would continue to be availa-
ble as before under the logical relationship test; or (2) ancillary
jurisdiction would be available, but only under the common nu-
cleus test.2 8
More importantly, the Court gave no guidance as to whether
the Gibbs limitations on discretion should apply in the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction. Because the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine
had developed before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,29 the Court
had exhibited little reluctance to decide ancillary claims so long as
power to decide those claims existed.80 Even in the post-Erie era,
when the ancillary claim must be assessed under state law, the de-
fensive, reactive nature of the typical ancillary claim will often re-
quire the full exercise of jurisdictional power if the goals of conve-
nience and fairness to the parties are to be advanced.,"
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange32 suggests that a coun-
terclaim within a federal court's ancillary jurisdiction may be adju-
dicated even though the federal claim has received summary dispo-
25. In the leading case of Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860), the original
plaintiff's prejudgment attachment of the property prompted the mortgagee's efforts to pro-
tect his interest in the property. The federal court was said to have ancillary jurisdiction,
but the competing claims to the property could not be construed to arise from a common
nucleus of operative fact.
26. See id.
27. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n., 383 U.S. 607, 617 n.14 (1966).
28. The Court later signified a preference for the former standard, see note 64 & ac-
companying text infra, but simultaneously refused to state whether there is a principled
difference between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, see note 66 infra.
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court in Erie held that in nonfederal claim diversity suits,
the federal courts would apply state law and not develop an independent body of federal
common law.
30. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
31. See Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 72 (3d Cir. 1971). The Third
Circuit in Schwab, reversing the lower court's discretionary refusal to consider third-party
claims that might have produced jury confusion, suggested the use of separate trials. This is
a practice, however, which Gibbs would seem to disapprove. See 383 U.S. at 727.
32. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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sition. The plaintiff in Moore alleged a violation of federal
antitrust law, arguing that the defendant's restrictions on the dis-
semination of market quotations involved an impermissible re-
straint of trade. The defendant counterclaimed for an injunction
against the plaintiff's misappropriation of the market quotations in
question. On a preliminary motion, the trial court denied relief to
the plaintiff, but entered an injunction on the counterclaim.3  Al-
though the counterclaim raised a state law claim and the parties
were not of diverse citizenship, the Supreme Court approved the
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim. The
Court rationalized this exercise of "ancillary" jurisdiction as a
means of making more effective the judgment rendered against the
plaintiff. Unless so restrained, the plaintiff might have continued
to misappropriate what he had been unable to attain by legal
process.3 4
Unless Gibbs is taken as giving the most general of sugges-
tions, Moore might seem wrong. Gibbs states that once the court
has terminated the federal question with minimal effort, it should
dismiss the pendent state law claim.3 5 In a case like Moore, how-
ever, not to grant complete relief would work an injustice on the
defendant, who has prevailed on the issues giving the court its
jurisdiction.
Consequences of a Failure to Exercise Discretion in Assuming
Federal Jurisdiction
It is unclear whether the discretion guidelines of Gibbs carry
much force even in cases of pendent jurisdiction that rigidly fit the
Gibbs mold. Notwithstanding all the cautionary language about
wise use of discretion, the courts of appeals have been loathe to
reverse an exercise of admitted power that offends the Gibbs
guidelines.36 A litigant who has unsuccessfully opposed the exercise
33. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 291 F. 681 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 296 F. 61 (2d Cir.
1923).
34. 270 U.S. at 727.
35. 383 U.S. at 610.
36. See, e.g., Brunswick v. Regent, 463 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Spring-
field Television, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 462 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1972); Ryan v. J. Walter
Thompson Co., 453 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945 (1972);
Gray v. International Ass'n of Heat & F.I. & A.W., 447 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1971). For au-
thorities that follow Gibbs, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MMLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3567, at 451-52 n.34 (1975).
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of pendent jurisdiction and has then lost on the merits as well will
find it difficult to demonstrate prejudice arising from a clear abuse
of Gibbs discretion. If issues are raised regarding the merits, the
appellate court will usually consider itself competent to resolve
these issues. If the appellate court wishes to instruct the lower
court on the subtleties of Gibbs, reversal is not needed. 7 For the
appellate court to reverse merely prolongs a resolution of the con-
troversy on the merits.
Gibbs might be especially misleading if it is construed to re-
quire that the claim conferring jurisdiction on the court should al-
ways be considered first on the merits as a precondition to the wise
use of discretion. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,38
decided long before Gibbs, stated that a federal court may decide
issues of state law even though it refuses to adjudicate the federal
claim. As long as the federal claim is substantial enough to confer
jurisdiction, the court may proceed to a consideration of the state
law claim, rendering no decision on the merits of the constitutional
claim. Siler manifests the federal courts' historic, desire to avoid, if
possible, the determination of federal constitutional issues.39 Be-
cause constitutional pronouncements have permanence, they
should be rendered only when necessary. If state law can give relief
to the plaintiff, a federal court should avoid deciding the merits of
the constitutional claim.
Post-Gibbs Developments
The Supreme Court has shown a recent willingness to limit
the extension of the judicial doctrine of pendent jurisdiction where
such an extension would conflict with the will of Congress. In three
recent cases the Court has discerned a congressional intent that
pendent jurisdiction not allow a claimant to circumvent the juris-
dictional requirements established for the federal courts.
The two general federal jurisdictional statutes require a mini-
mum "amount in controversy ' ' O before a claim may be heard in
federal court. These statutes have been interpreted to allow a sin-
gle plaintiff to aggregate his or her claims against a single defen-
37. See Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
39. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1976).
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dant.4' Multiple plaintiffs with separate interests, however, may
not aggregate claims against a single defendant. Unless their inter-
ests are joint and undivided, each plaintiff is obliged to allege a
claim exceeding the jurisdictional amount. 2
One means of avoiding the rule prohibiting aggregation of
claims would be to assert that one plaintiff's claim exceeding the
jurisdictional amount is the "primary" claim, and the other insuffi-
cient claims are pendent claims. In Zahn v. International Paper
Company,4" the Court rejected such an application of the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine and required each member of the class, not
merely the class representatives, to state a claim exceeding the
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement.4 In large part, the
Court justified its position by reliance on an indirect form of legis-
lative approval of the Court's earlier interpretations of the statu-
tory language "amount in controversy." The Court concluded that
reenactment of these statutes with changes only in the minimum
value of the required "amount in controversy" indicated congres-
sional approval of the nonaggregation rule and that to allow this
rule to be circumvented by the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
would frustrate congressional intent. Thus, the Court reasoned, al-
though Congress may have a general policy in favor of convenience,
efficiency, and fairness, as reflected in the Federal Rules, Congress
has declared, at least implicitly, that this general policy must give
way when a party's related claim is not large enough to enter fed-
eral court in its own right.45
A more direct expression of legislative intent was held to frus-
trate expansion of pendent jurisdiction in a later case, Aldinger v.
41. See C. WIGHT, HANDBOOK op THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 36, at 138 (3d ed.
1976).
42. See, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
43. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
44. Id. at 301.
45. Id. This author has previously pointed out a flaw in the Court's reasoning. See
Theis, Zahn v. International Paper Co.: The Non-Aggregation Rule in Jurisdictional
Amount Cases, 35 LA. L. REv. 89, 95 (1974). The Supreme Court's reliance on implied con-
gressional intent may well be an erroneous interpretation of Congress' silence when the area
concerned is one in flux rather than one involving a settled or consistent application of law.
Where the field of law under discussion is in a state of tension, congressional silence may
mean nothing more than that Congress wishes the courts to work out a solution. Cf. Rogers,
Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws,
14 Hous. L. REv. 611, 622-29 (1977) (examining the consideration given legislative silence
following an initial interpretation of a statute when a charge is made that the original inter-
pretation was erroneous).
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Howard.4 6 The plaintiff in Aldinger sued several county employees
in federal court for violation of federal civil rights. At the time
Aldinger was decided, the employer county could not be liable for
a violation of federal law,47 but might have been held liable on a
state law claim. The plaintiff therefore argued that the state law
claim against the employer was pendent to the federal claims
against the employees because they all arose from a common nu-
cleus of operative fact. Plaintiff thus attempted to make the
county employer a "pendent party."48
The Aldinger Court exploited Gibbs' failure to analyze the
statutory basis for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Gibbs had
not engaged in statutory analysis, charged Aldinger, because Con-
gress "had said nothing... [to] offer guidance on the kind of elu-
sive question addressed in... Gibbs. . . .'4 The Court went on
to state that courts should hesitate to extend pendent jurisdiction
beyond the jurisdictional limits marked out by Congress, especially
when the plaintiff can obtain an efficient resolution of his or her
claims in state court by joinder of parties;50 implying that congres-
sional approval of the statutory provision for liberal joinder of par-
ties contained in the Federal Rules51 should carry little weight. 2
The Court nevertheless predicated its decision on evidence that
Congress "expressly or by implication negated"s the claimed ex-
pansion of pendent jurisdiction," concluding that congressional in-
tent negated the assertion of pendent jurisdiction over the state
46. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). For an excellent discussion of Aldinger, see Comment, Aldinger
v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 127 (1977).
47. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court held municipal governments
were not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In Monell v. Department
of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court significantly qualified its statements regard-
ing municipal liability. On the facts of Aldinger, it is unclear whether a plaintiff would now
be able to sustain a federal cause of action against a governmental employer under 42 U.S.C,
§ 1983.
48. See Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U.
Prrr. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
49. 427 U.S. at 13-14.
50. Id. at 15. See also Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th
Cir. 1972).
51. Fan. R. Civ. P. 19.
52. See 427 U.S. at 14-15.
53. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
54. To frame the inquiry as was done in the quoted language presupposes that, as
noted in the previous discussion of Gibbs, see text accompanying notes 13-17 supra, Con-
gress, through its approval of the Rules, approves of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
whenever statutory procedures present the opportunity for its application.
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law claim against the county. The Court reasoned that Congress
had expressly refused to create a federal cause of action against the
county; therefore, it must have intended that the county not be
brought into federal court through an application of pendent juris-
diction.55 Congress provided that the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over civil rights claims 56 and, by implication, negated pendent
jurisdiction over a state law claim unless a federal claim had been
stated against the same defendant.
The Court's explication of legislative intent in Aldinger re-
flects its earlier confusion about the effect of congressional ap-
proval of the Rules. Although Congress may have intended to deny
a cause of action to a plaintiff alleging a federal claim against a
state municipality,57 Congress did not negate pendent jurisdiction
over state law claims against a party exempted from federal liabil-
ity. The jurisdictional statute makes a positive, predictable state-
ment: federal courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action.
Because Congress created no cause of action against the county, it
understandably made no statement about cognate causes of action
that the proposed cause of action would have complemented. It
should require a strong declaration to conclude that federal courts
do not have jurisdiction over related state law claims. If a grant of
jurisdiction is also a denial of pendent jurisdiction over all claims
not explicitly within that grant of jurisdiction, pendent jurisdiction
would seldom be available. Had Congress intended to exclude from
federal courts state as well as federal claims against the county, it
would have prohibited diversity jurisdiction over such state law
claims. In fact, it took no such action, and the Court had approved
such diversity jurisdiction only shortly before Aldinger.5 8
The Court made its most recent pronouncement regarding the
scope of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in Owen Equipment
& Erection Co. v. Kroger e and has once again restricted the use of
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as a means of expanding the
55. "Parties such as counties, whom Congress excluded from liability in § 1983, and
therefore by reference in the grant of jurisdiction under § 1343(3), can argue with a great
deal of force that the scope of that 'civil action' over which the district courts have been
given statutory jurisdiction should not be so broadly read as to bring them back within that
power merely because the facts also give rise to an ordinary civil action against them under
state law." 427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
57. See note 47 supra.
58. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
59. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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jurisdiction of the federal courts. The plaintiff in Kroger brought a
diversity action in federal court. The defendant impleaded a third-
party defendant against whom the plaintiff asserted a claim. All of
the claims arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact, but the
plaintiff was not diverse from the third-party defendant.6e The
Court disapproved the use of ancillary jurisdiction because the
plaintiff would then circumvent the Court's early holding in Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss"1 that a plaintiff must be diverse from all defen-
dants. In the Court's view, more than circumvention of Straw-
bridge was at stake. Congress had never disapproved the
Strawbridge construction of the diversity statute, and thus Con-
gress was understood to have intended that a plaintiff must be di-
verse from all defendants. To allow the claim against the nondi-
verse third-party defendant to enter the federal court under the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction would ignore the will of Con-
gress.6 2 As in Zahn, the Court refused to countermand the implied
congressional approval of its prior decisions.6 3
Two significant points may be noted in Kroger. The Court im-
plied that ancillary claims must meet the logical relationship test
and not the common nucleus test. Moreover, in Kroger the logical
relationship test proved less inclusive than the common nucleus
test. The Court asserted that the plaintiff's claim against the third-
party defendant had no logical dependence on the original claim
because the third party's liability was not dependent on the origi-
nal defendant's liability, even though both claims arose out of a
common nucleus of operative fact." This analysis would seem to
preclude ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim against a
third-party defendant even when the primary claim is a federal
question,6 5 underscoring the uncertainty created by the Court's re-
60. Until trial, the third-party defendant appeared to be diverse from the original
plaintiff. Then, claiming that it was a citizen of the same state as the original plaintiff, the
third-party defendant sought dismissal on the grounds that the statute of limitations had
run. The court of appeals applied pendent jurisdiction to counter the third-party defen-
dant's inequitable conduct.
61. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
62. Most of the lower courts had reached the same result. See, e.g., Kenrose Mfg. Co.
v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972). But see Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th
Cir. 1974).
63. For detailed criticism of Kroger, see Garvey, The Limits of Ancillary Jurisdiction,
57 Tsx. L. REv. 697 (1979).
64. 437 U.S. at 376.
65. Under this rationale, the Aldinger case might have been decided without any spe-
cific inquiry into the congressional intent underlying the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff's
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fusal to distinguish between or to consolidate ancillary and pen-
dent jurisdiction.6
Significantly, the Court in Kroger suggested that an analysis
of the applicability of ancillary jurisdiction might consider the con-
gressional goal of an efficient, fair disposition of related claims.6 7
Only the limitation the Court perceived from congressional accept-
ance of Strawbridge precluded the application of ancillary jurisdic-
tion in Kroger. This suggestion is consistent with the unstated ra-
tionale underlying Gibbs: absent contrary indication, Congress
would approve of the adjudication of state law claims in a federal
case in federal court if the goals behind the Rules would thereby
be advanced. 8 It further supports the Aldinger Court's indication
that the expansion of pendent jurisdiction will be limited only
where there is a "negative indication" that congressional intent
may be subverted.6 9
Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger all emphasize congressional intent
as a limit on pendent jurisdiction, strongly adhering to the princi-
ple that the Court may not retreat from its prior interpretations of
statutes where reenactment of the statutes signifies congressional
approval of judicial interpretation. More comprehensive principles
defining the scope of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction have yet
to appear. As a consequence, the cases developing the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction over federal claims have proceeded in an un-
disciplined fashion.
claim against the employer in Aldinger did not meet the logical relationship test of ancillary
jurisdiction as set forth in Kroger. Jurisdiction over the claim thus could have been denied.
The Aldinger Court, however, stressed that "pendenting a party" might be possible in other
contexts, particularly where the primary claim was one over which the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction such as the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). 427 U.S.
at 18. See Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1979). In fact, a number of lower
courts had approved "pendent party" jurisdiction in federal question cases. See, e.g., Schul-
man v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormac-
lynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2nd Cir. 1971). Kroger's dictum, however, makes these holdings suspect.
66. Notwithstanding the dictum about the scope of ancillary jurisdiction, Kroger had
refused to address whether there was any principled diference between pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction. 437 U.S. at 370 n.8. Accord, Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
67. 437 U.S. at 377.
68. See notes 10-17 & accompanying text supra.
69. See notes 53-54 & accompanying text supra.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
JURISDICTIONS OVER CLAIMS
Pendent Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims
Romero: An Inauspicious Beginning
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.70 was the
first case to consider the use of pendent jurisdiction over federal
law claims. Romero, a Spanish seaman and a crew member of a
Spanish vessel, sustained a shipboard injury in United States wa-
ters. He brought suit in federal district court against the Spanish
owner of the vessel as well as against the American companies pro-
viding stevedoring services for the vessel. Two sets of claims were
asserted, one against the vessel owner under the Jones Act and an-
other against both the owner and the American stevedoring com-
panies for violations of general maritime law.
Any discussion of Romero must proceed from the premise that
Romero's strategic objective was to obtain a jury trial on all of his
claims. The Jones Act specifically allowed him that option as to
claims under that Act.7 1 The claims against his employer arising
under general maritime law would not normally call for jury trial.
Historically, admiralty had proceeded without jury trial and the
Jones Act granted only a limited modification of this tradition.
Clearly, the claims under general maritime law were within the
court's admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1333, but for
the same reason were not subject to jury trial. Romero asserted
that these admiralty claims arose under federal law and were
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction conferred by 28
U.S.C. section 1331. Although they were governed by maritime law,
they also arose under federal law in the more general sense re-
quired by section 1331.72 Because the claims were "on the law
side" of the court, they could be tried by jury.73
Although the Supreme Court rejected Romero's federal ques-
tion argument,7 4 ruling that it had jurisdiction over the maritime
70. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
71. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
72. See American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916)
(Holmes, J.) ("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.").
73. For a full discussion of the admiralty aspects of Romero, see Currie, The Silver
Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1959).
74. 358 U.S. at 380. To appreciate the force of this argument, one must recall the
unquestioned doctrine that, when diversity of citizenship between the parties exists, the
plaintiff may characterize maritime claims as within the court's diversity jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1332, and, trying the claims "on the law side," seek trial by jury. See Wilburn Boat
Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
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law claims under section 1333, the Court declared in a remarkably
casual manner that the general maritime law claims against the
employer could be pendent to the Jones Act claim:"
[T]he District Court may have jurisdiction [over the general
claims] "pendent" to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act. Of
course the considerations which call for the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction of a state claim related to a pending federal cause of
action ... are not the same when, as here, what is involved are
related claims based on the federal maritime law .... [A] dis-
trict judge has jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action
has been stated if that jurisdiction has been invoked by a com-
plaint at law rather than a libel in admiralty, as long as the com-
plaint also properly alleged a claim under the Jones Act. We are
not called upon to decide whether the District Court may submit
to the jury the "pendent" claims. . . in the event that a cause of
action be found to exist.70
In a later part of the opinion, however, the Court concluded that
Romero had not stated a cause of action against his employer, ei-
ther under the Jones Act or under general maritime law.77
85 (1946). Indeed, Romero argued that his claims against the American companies were just
such diversity claims and therefore merited trial by jury. The lower court accepted this
theory, but dismissed because the presence of the Spanish employer destroyed the complete
diversity required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Romero's remain-
ing argument, which the Court rejected, thus could be stated briefly: just as admiralty
claims enter the Court under § 1333 but could also enter under § 1332 and be tried by a
jury, so also admiralty claims enter under § 1333 but could also enter under § 1331 and be
tried by a jury.
75. The Court gave no consideration to the converse situation in which the Jones Act
claim might be pendent to the general maritime law claims. On the facts of the case, this
characterization would be academic unless one were to argue that Romero should have no
jury trial as to any of his claims. To characterize either claim as pendent to the other would
seem equally permissible. If convenience and efficiency mandate trial of all claims by a sin-
gle fact finder rather than a conclusion that the Jones Act claim was pendent to the mari-
time claim would be as persuasive as the contrary conclusion reached in Romero. Because
Congress mandated jury trial for Jones Act claims, should the plaintiff so desire, any judicial
limitation of this right would have been most unusual, notwithstanding a judicial appraisal
of convenience and efficiency. As noted earlier, congressional intent strongly shapes the use
of pendent jurisdiction. See notes 45, 50-53, 62-63 & accompanying text supra.
76. 358 U.S. at 380-81 (emphasis added). The lower court had, as a matter of discre-
tion, refused to exercise even admiralty jurisdiction since plaintiff had remedies against his
employer which he might seek from the Spanish consul in New York. 142 F. Supp. 570, 574
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). Although on review the Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the claims
in admiralty, it proceeded to rule that United States law could not be applied. 358 U.S. at
384. It evidently dismissed the action because Spanish law gave an administrative remedy
that an American court would be incompetent to provide.
77. 358 U.S. at 384-85. The Court remanded the claims against the American steve-
doring companies. Id.
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The Court's conclusion that pendent jurisdiction might be ap-
propriate for federal, and not only state, claims did not provide
any guidelines for determining when pendent jurisdiction over fed-
eral claims should be exercised. Arguably, the pendent claim in Ro-
mero was a separate cause of action 7 8 which, under the then pre-
vailing test for pendent jurisdiction over state law claims,7 9 would
have foreclosed jurisdiction. Under the standard later announced
in Gibbs, however, a court in its discretion may assert pendent ju-
risdiction over state law claims sharing a "common nucleus of op-
erative fact" with a substantial federal claim.80 Because the ship
accident provided a common nucleus of fact giving rise to all of
Romero's claims, Romero probably falls within the Gibbs standard
for pendent jurisdiction over state law claims. The rationale of
Gibbs, however, is not necessarily applicable to pendent jurisdic-
tion over federal claims. In Romero, for example, the "appended"
admiralty claim was clearly within the federal court's subject mat-
ter jurisdiction; no added efficiency could result from the use of
pendent jurisdiction. Plaintiff's entitlement to jury trial was the
real issue in the case; and, although the Court concluded that the
maritime claims could be pendent, it refused to commit itself to
jury trial for the pendent claims, the only significant consequence
of such a characterization.
Romero does not elucidate a dichotomy between power and
discretion like that later developed in Gibbs. Specifically, the dis-
position a federal court should make of a pendent federal claim if
it dismisses the primary claim at an early stage of the litigation is
unclear. In Romero itself, the Court decided, virtually simultane-
ously, that neither claim stated a cause of action against the em-
ployer. Perhaps federal courts should not shy away from deciding
pendent federal claims. The federal courts have a special compe-
tence in deciding questions of federal law and need not exhibit the
same circumspection required to avoid unnecessary decisions of
state law issues. The pendent claims in Romero not only raised is-
sues of federal law, but also fell within the district court's jurisdic-
tion in any event. Moreover, decision of the pendent claim re-
quired little or no effort additional to that expended on the
78. See generally The Rolph, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924).
79. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
80. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
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primary claim.81
Romero takes a very tentative step in authorizing the develop-
ment of an analogue to the traditional pendent jurisdiction doc-
trine. Its application is narrow and so enveloped in the obscurities
of admiralty law that general principles may be elusive or even
nonexistent. The Court's major guidance in this area is negative:
the doctrine in pendent federal claim cases is "not the same" as
that developed in pendent state claim cases.8 2
Jurisdictional Amount and The Pendent Federal Claim
The major development of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
over federal claims has occurred in cases in which a federal claim,
insufficient to meet the federal amount in controversy require-
ment, has been characterized as "pendent" to another jurisdiction-
ally sufficient claim. By using the pendent jurisdiction doctrine in
these cases, the courts have often made decisions based on the ju-
risdictionally insufficient claims in order to avoid deciding princi-
pal claims that involve constitutional issues.
In Rosado v. Wyman,83 the plaintiffs challenged a New York
statute regulating the disbursement of welfare benefits and re-
quested consideration of their claims by a three judge district
court."" The plaintiffs first alleged that the statute deprived them
of equal protection. They also asserted that the statute conflicted
with the federal Social Security Act, in violation of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. Although raising a constitutional issue,
the second claim was considered statutory in nature. The single
federal judge to whom their case had been assigned issued a tem-
porary restraining order and called for the convocation of a three
judge court on which he would serve with two other judges. After
the three judge court had convened and heard arguments, the New
York Legislature amended the statute in question. The three judge
court then dismissed the equal protection claim on mootness
grounds; but instead of dismissing the statutory claim as well, the
court remanded it to the single judge for disposition. 5
81. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
82. 358 U.S. at 380-81.
83. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). Congress has virtually abandoned the three judge court
apparatus. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. CooPER, FERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4234-4235, at 379-87 (1975).
85. 397 U.S. at 400.
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Appellants urged that, although the three judge court had ju-
risdiction over constitutional challenges to state statutes, the
court's limited jurisdiction under section 13436 did not extend to a
claim that a state statute conflicted with a federal statute violating
the supremacy clause. Appellants asserted that, although the
courts have jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy
over claims of constitutional deprivation,87 statutory claims do not
present constitutional questions in the narrow sense of section
1343."' Thus, they asserted that each plaintiff must satisfy the
amount in controversy requirement in 28 U.S.C. section 1331 for
that individual's statutory claim to come within the jurisdiction of
the district court.89
An earlier decision of the Supreme Court had approved, with-
out elaboration, the use of pendent jurisdiction to circumvent ju-
risdictional deficiencies.90 The statutory claim was considered pen-
dent to the constitutional claim; thus, neither claim was subject to
a jurisdictional amount requirement. Rosado approved this case as
settled doctrine,91 thus using pendent jurisdiction to pursue the
traditional policy of avoiding the decision of a constitutional issue.
At the same time, however, the Court subverted the policy behind
the amount in controversy requirement, a policy that limited the
application of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims three
years later in Zahn.2
The Rosado court then carefully examined whether the pen-
dent statutory claim should be litigated once the primary claim
had been dismissed.93 Because the Court had already avoided the
constitutional issue through mootness, it did not need to employ
pendent jurisdiction to avoid a constitutional pronouncement. Two
factors guided the Court's exercise of discretionary power in decid-
ing whether to hear the pendent claim: prior investment of judicial
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
87. This argument was sustained in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
89. The appellants also asserted that the three judge court had jurisdiction over con-
stitutional claims only, and not over statutory claims, even those exceeding $10,000 in accor-
dance with § 1331. See Swift v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
90. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968) (three judge court had decided
both the constitutional and the statutory claim on the merits).
91. 397 U.S. at 402.
92. See notes 43-45 & accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 32-34, 38-39 & accompanying text supra.
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resources in the case and the character of the pendent claim.9 Be-
cause considerable effort had been invested in the case before the
constitutional claim became moot, and because "the statutory
question is so essentially one 'of federal policy that the argument
for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong,' ,5 the
Rosado court heard the statutory claim. Finally, the Court saw no
difficulty in the single judge exercising jurisdiction over the pen-
dent statutory claim remanded to him by the three judge court.
Rather, the Court thought it was a wise use of discretion for the
three judge court not to decide the pendent claim but to remit it to
the single judge. Thus the three judge court need not dismiss after
the primary claim becomes moot, but commits no abuse in re-
questing one judge to perform the task of three.
In Hagans v. Lavine96 the Court again demonstrated its will-
ingness to employ the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to avoid
constitutional issues.97 Moreover, it suggested that, by their nature,
pendent claims do not fall within the discretion guidelines an-
nounced in Gibbs for state law claims. In Hagans the single district
court judge scrutinized a constitutional claim and decided that it
was substantial enough to confer jurisdiction. The single judge
then proceeded to examine the statutory claims, anticipating the
type of remand from the three judge court approved in Rosado.
On review, the Supreme Court made no substantive disposi-
tion of the constitutional claim. It merely ruled that the claim was
not "unsubstantial,"98 thereby conferring jurisdiction over the en-
tire case, including the pendent statutory claim. Although the pri-
mary claim was not unsubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, it did
not necessarily state a cause of action.
The Court looked to the historic practice, originating in
94. 397 U.S. at 403.
95. Id. at 404 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)).
96. 415 U.S. 528 (1974). See generally Seid, The Tail Wags the Dog: Hagans v. Lavine
and Pendent Jurisdiction, 53 J. URBAN L. 1 (1975).
97. The court has recently ruled that "statutory" claims, if pressed alone, must meet
the requirement of § 1331 and may not enter federal court under § 1343. See Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600 (1979). It is likely that such claims will
continue to be heard as pendent claims inasmuch as Chapman did not overrule Hagans.
Moreover, Congress has recognized, if not approved, the Hagans line of cases. See Maher v.
Gagne, 100 S. Ct. 2570, 2576 & n.15 (1980); Silva v. Vowell, 621 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1980);
Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 166-67 (8th Cir. 1980); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646-
47 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1843 (1980); Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d 1156, 1159
(3d Cir. 1979). But see Lopez v. Arraras, 606 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1979) (dicta).
98. 415 U.S. at 536-43.
[Vol 32
JURISDICTIONS OVER CLAIMS
Siler,o9 whereby pendent state claims have been considered in or-
der to avoid constitutional claims. The Court found that Gibbs did
not purport to overturn Siler.00 Moreover, the discussion of dis-
cretion in Gibbs centered upon "considerations of comity and the
desirability of having a reliable and final determination of the state
claim by state courts . .. "101 -considerations the Court found
"wholly irrelevant" 02 in a case involving pendent federal claims.
Thus, even if the three judge court had considered and denied the
constitutional claim for failure to state a cause of action, it might
designate a single judge to decide the pendent statutory claim. The
federal nature of the pendent claim makes federal disposition un-
questionably appropriate even though the claim does not meet the
amount in controversy requirement.
Although the Hagans court permitted pendent jurisdiction
even when the primary claim was dismissed, it reinforced the
theme introduced in Rosado that a three judge court should nor-
mally refuse to consider the pendent claim if single judge consider-
ation is also available. In Hagans, the Court approved the single
judge's anticipation of a remand when such a remand is the nor-
mal, desirable course of action. 03 Single judge treatment, of
course, freed two judges for other tasks. Moreover, it eliminated
direct Supreme Court review. 104
The dissenters in Hagans argued that although the constitu-
tional claim might have been substantial enough to confer jurisdic-
tion, it should have been resolved on the merits against the plain-
tiffs, leaving the statutory claim to be dismissed under the Gibbs
guidelines.0 5 Although, as the dissenters acknowledged, Gibbs ex-
pressed concern for needless decisions of state law, the federal
court should also be loathe to decide cases not meeting the juris-
dictional amount when Congress has decided that those cases are
best left to the state courts. In the dissenters' view, the "not insub-
99. Siler v. Louisville & N. R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). See text accompanying notes 38-
39 supra.
100. 415 U.S. at 547.
101. Id. at 548.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 543-44. If the single judge should deny the statutory claim, the three judge
court would then be obliged to decide the constitutional claim. It is unclear whether the
latter court would be bound by the single judge's decision. See Murrow v. Clifford, 502 F.2d
1066 (3d Cir. 1974); Doe v. Lukhsrd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974).
104. Se Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
105. 415 U.S. at 550-65 (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
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stantial" test for jurisdiction would eliminate very few constitu-
tional claims and, consequently, few pendent statutory claims, un-
less the Court were to insist upon the more rigid standards in
Gibbs for exercise of discretion. Hagans would allow plaintiffs to
avoid easily the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement.
According to the dissenters, colorable constitutional issues should
be decided, not avoided, so that statutory claims might be appro-
priately resolved in state courts.106
In contrast to its opinion in Hagans, the Court two years ear-
lier in Perez v. Ledema10 7 had indicated a narrower view of pen-
dent jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in Perez attacked the constitution-
ality of both a Louisiana state statute and a local ordinance that
had been the bases of obscenity prosecutions against the plaintiffs.
A three judge court was convened, but without the aid of pendent
jurisdiction it had no power to consider local ordinances. 10 8 Never-
theless, because the ordinance's operation gave rise to a common
nucleus of operative fact with the primary statutory claim, the
three judge court decided the entire case, ruling the ordinance un-
constitutional. 09 The Supreme Court, however, without mention-
ing Rosado, held the three judge court had no authority to pass
upon the local ordinance and reversed. 1 0 The Court thus implied
that pendent jurisdiction was appropriate only to avoid constitu-
tional issues, not to multiply them through the consideration of
municipal ordinances, hundreds of which may overlap with a given
state statute. Had the Court ruled otherwise, it would have created
the potential for more intrusive forays into constitutional
decisionmaking.111
106. Id. at 552, 565.
107. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
108. See Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97 (1967).
109. There is some confusion as to whether the three judge court issued a declaratory
judgment of the ordinance's unconstitutionality or merely expressed its view in dictum. In
any event, the single judge issued a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconsti-
tutional. Even if the view is taken that only the single judge issued a judgment as to the
ordinance, the Court's holding refutes a possible argument that it had pendent appellate
jurisdiction over the single judge's order. For a comparison, see Jaffee v. United States, 592
F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (discussed in the text accompanying notes 165-67 infra).
110. The Court also found inappropriate the relief given against the state statute. Re-
lying on the companion case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), it ruled that the
court's relief interfered with a pending criminal prosecution. 401 U.S. at 84-85.
111. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967) (three judge court), af'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968), in which the Court refused to allow
adults to challenge involuntary blood transfusions given to them without statutory author-
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Abney v. United States112 serves as another example that
when the Court is not attempting to avoid the decision of constitu-
tional issues, it has taken a narrrower view of pendent jurisdiction
over federal law claims. In Abney the defendants in a federal crin-
inal case moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a retrial
would expose them to double jeopardy. In allowing an interlocu-
tory appeal on this issue, the Court stressed the exceptional nature
of a double jeopardy claim. Congressional policy against piecemeal
appeals is embodied in the statutory requirement of a "final deci-
sion."' 1 The Court nevertheless reasoned that, if the protection
against double jeopardy is to have full meaning, a defendant
should have the opportunity to raise his or her argument before
trial. Without ever mentioning the phrase "pendent jurisdiction,"
the Court refused to consider the merits of the defendants' addi-
tional argument that the indictment failed to state an offense:
That a defendant may seek immediate appellate review of...
his double jeopardy claim is based on the special considerations
... which justify a departure from the normal rule of finality.
Quite obviously, such considerations do not extend beyond the
claim of former jeopardy and encompass other claims presented
to, and rejected by, the district court in passing on the accused's
motion to dismiss.
[A]ny other rule would encourage criminal defendants to seek re-
view of, or assert, frivolous double jeopardy claims in order to
bring more serious, but otherwise nonappealable questions to the
attention of the courts of appeal prior to conviction and
sentence."1'
The court reaffirmed its commitment to this position in United
States v. MacDonald,11 5 in which it refused to consider an interloc-
utory appeal of a speedy trial claim that the court of appeals had
deemed pendent to a double jeopardy claim.116
ity. The adults in King County argued that they should be able to join a challenge brought
by juveniles against a specific state statute applicable to juveniles only.
112. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
114. 431 U.S. at 663.
115. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). Accord, Spaten v. Manson, 619 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980). But
see Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1979).
116. Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105 (1979), aff'g 445 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex.
1978), does appear to extend jurisdiction over a pendent party in violation of Aldinger, see
notes 46-58 supra, as charged by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. 439 U.S. at 1105 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist observed that the pendent party was virtually iden-
tical with the governmental entity. Id. at 1110.
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A few recent cases have chosen to expand on the more liberal
jurisdictional principles of Rosado and Hagans rather than adopt
the more restrictive approaches of Perez and Abney. 117 In Network
Project v. Corporation for Public Broadcasting18 the plaintiff
brought an action in federal district court, alleging that various
federal officials" 9 had censored public broadcast programming.
The complaint alleged both violations of the federal statute estab-
lishing the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and violations of
first amendment rights. The lower court dismissed all claims; but
the court of appeals reversed, ruling that the district court had ju-
risdiction over the statutory claim under 28 U.S.C. section 1337,12°
which confers jurisdiction over claims arising under laws regulating
interstate commerce. 121 Section 1337 has no amount in controversy
requirement, but does not allow jurisdiction over constitutional
claims. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the constitutional
claim, without meeting the amount in controversy requirement,
could be pendent to the statutory claim. Further, even if the pri-
mary claim were dismissed at an early stage in the litigation, it
would be an abuse of discretion to dismiss the constitutional
claim. 22 Quoting from Hagans, the court stated that pendent fed-
eral claims ordinarily should not be dismissed under the guidelines
for discretion set forth in Gibbs for state law claims. The Court
117. See Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d 1259 (2d Cir. 1977); Lynch v. Phlbrook, 550 F.2d
793 (2d Cir. 1977); Bourgeas v. Stevens, 532 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1976); Burns v. Vowell, 424 F.
Supp. 1135 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Nelson v. Likins, 389 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Minn. 1974), afl'd, 510
F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975); Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975); Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587
(W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 807 (1972).
118. 561 F.2d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Accord, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Campbell, 589 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (alternative holding) (pendent parties); Finnerty v.
Cowen, 508 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1974); Fouke Co. v. Mandel, 386 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Md. 1974)
(alternative holding); River v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va.)
(alternative holding), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
119. At the time suit was filed, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) had not been amended to
dispense with a jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement in actions against federal
officials. Network Project refused to decide whether the defendants were federal officials
within the meaning of amended § 1331. 561 F.2d at 972 n.70. See National Treasury Em-
ployees Union v. Campbell, 589 F.2d 669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (an alternative holding that
the amendment to § 1331 is retroactive).
120. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceed-
ing arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and com-
merce against restraints and monopolies." 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
121. The lower courts have given a broad reading to § 1337. See, e.g., Finnerty v.
Cowen, 508 F.2d 979, 983 (2d Cir. 1974).
122. 561 F.2d at 968-72.
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found it was particularly appropriate for pendent federal claims to
be adjudicated in federal courts, and that only unusual circum-
stances should prevent this result."' 3
The decision in Project Network is puzzling because it seems
to conflict with the desire to avoid constitutional issues, and in-
stead allows the constitutional question to come in as pendent to a
statutory claim.124 The court's statement as to the proper exercise
of discretion is an unwarranted extension of Hagans. Had the
court dismissed the constitutional claim, the plaintiff could have
refiled in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the court
of general jurisdiction for the District of Columbia. 125 Even assum-
ing there is some importance in having federal adjudication of fed-
eral issues, the superior court might have addressed the pendent
federal claim and thus freed the district court, a court of limited
jurisdiction, to determine major constitutional challenges.
Although discretionary dismissal may have fragmented the lit-
igation and discouraged resort to the district court for resolution of
the statutory claim within its jurisdiction under section 1337, a
federal court under Gibbs may validly discourage such resort when
the plaintiff has a primary claim which is "substantial" for juris-
dictional purposes, but nonetheless is a substantively weak claim.
Because in these cases the Gibbs guidelines on discretion would
discourage resort to federal court when the pendent claim involves
state law and is appropriate for state courts, Gibbs should also dis-
courage resort to federal court when the pendent claim is so small
that it belongs in state court, even though it may raise issues of
federal law. Otherwise, the plaintiff may indirectly accomplish a
prohibited result through artful pleading of the primary claim. 26
123. Id. at 971.
124. In the other cases cited in note 118 supra, the pendent claims did not raise con-
stitutional issues. To that extent, those cases are not as objectionable as Network Project.
Nonetheless, the pendent claims did not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement im-
posed by Congress and did not avoid the decision of constitutional issues. But see Hales v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1974).
125. The Supreme Court's opinions have given increasing recognition to the dignity of
article I courts in the District of Columbia. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389
(1973).
126. The recent amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 should eliminate the need for pendent
jurisdiction in most of the cases cited in note 118 supra, because plaintiffs need not allege a
jurisdictional amount in controversy against federal officials. The District of Columbia court
refused to interpret this amendment in Network Project. 561 F.2d at 972 n.70. But see
National Treasury Employees Union v. Campbell, 589 F.2d 669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
amendment would also supersede Connecticut Union Welfare Employees v. White, 357 F.
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Recent Developments in the Lower Courts
Courts have hesitated to allow the exercise of pendent juris-
diction when they have lacked independent jurisdiction over a fed-
eral claim for some reason other than inadequacy of jurisdictional
amount. Convenience and fairness to the parties are laudatory
goals; however, they are not absolutes, and contrary signals from
Congress may force these goals into subordinate positions. When
Congress has designated a claim not merely for federal court treat-
ment, but for treatment by a particular federal court, it doubtless
had specific goals in mind, and it probably valued these goals more
highly than the general goals supporting the exercise of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction. Similarly, if Congress has granted fed-
eral jurisdiction over a claim, but only on certain conditions, it
probably intended' other goals to predominate.
Exclusive Jurisdiction
Vesting exclusive jurisdiction over a claim in one court would
seem to preclude another court from asserting pendent jurisdiction
over that claim.127 For example, although state courts may deter-
mine issues of patent law, Congress has made an express declara-
tion that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over redress for
patent infringement.128 A state court thus should not exercise juris-
diction over a patent infringement claim that is pendent to state
law claims arising out of a common nucleus of operative facts.12
The need for convenience and efficiency in the state courts should
not subvert exclusive federal jurisdiction, particularly in cases in
which a federal court may promote convenience and efficiency by
itself asserting pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims re-
lated to the federal claim of patent infringement."'
Supp. 1378 (D. Conn. 1973), which made a claim against a federal official pendent to a claim
against a state official.
127. Cf. City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review FAA "order" may not be evaded by framing district court action as claim
"arising under" Environmental Protection Act) (numerous cases collected).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976).
129. See New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 743 (1912);
Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 131 Misc. 834, 228 N.Y.S. 412 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd, 224 A.D. 733, 230 N.Y.S. 817 (1928); Southland Sweet Potato Curing & Storage As'n
v. Beck, 221 S.W. 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). But see Miller v. Lucas, 51 Cal. App. 3d 774,
124 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1975).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976). See Jenn-Air Prod. Co. v. Penn Ventilator, Inc., 283
F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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Cases arising out of the "price freeze" in the early 1970's pro-
vide further guidance on the relationship between exclusive juris-
diction and pendent federal claims. Suppliers of natural gas had
written clauses into their customers' contracts stipulating that the
suppliers could automatically pass on to their customers price in-
creases for gas sold to the customers. The price freeze stayed the
operation of these "escalator" clauses pending examination of the
clauses by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for consistency
with the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA). Exclusive jurisdiction
to review decisions of the FPC lay in the courts of appeals.""1 Cases
arising under ESA, however, are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the district courts and are appealable through an expedited pro-
cess to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA). 32
When the FPC found the escalator clauses consistent with the
ESA and allowed the suppliers to charge under these clauses for
gas already delivered as well as for future deliveries, the customers
faced a dilemma: their case fit under either the FPC review statute
or the ESA jurisdictional statute or perhaps both, and the two
statutes gave exclusive jurisdiction to two different courts. The
customers brought suit in both the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and a district court, whose proceedings were reviewed by
TECA.
Both the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 33 and the
TECA134 held that only the TECA could review the argument that
the FPC ruling violated ESA. The court of appeals could not exer-
cise pendent jurisdiction over ESA claims, an area exclusively
within the TECA's power. Moreover, the TECA also held that a
claim committed exclusively to the jurisdiction of the regular
courts of appeals could not be heard by the TECA.13 5 Thus, exclu-
sive jurisdiction was entirely incompatible with the exercise of pen-
dent jurisdiction.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals originally had sug-
131. 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1976).
132. 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976).
133. Connecticut Mut. Group v. FPC, 498 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Coastal
States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1979). But see,
St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ogilvie, 496 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1974) (ESA allegations raised in answer
but not complaint).
134. City of Groton v. FPC, 487 F.2d 927 (Temp. Em. Ct. App. 1973).
135. Id. at 935; accord, Spinetti v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 522 F.2d 1401 (Temp. Em.
Ct. App. 1975).
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gested that it must exercise its exclusive jurisdiction only when the
issues were "cleanly severable. '13 6 If the issues were not cleanly
severable, the TECA should decide the entire case. Because it de-
termined that the issues were not cleanly severable, the court of
appeals dismissed even the retroactive rate-making claim.137 The
TECA, however, regarded the issues as severable and deferred to
the court of appeals' exclusive jurisdiction. When the TECA re-
fused to decide the entire case, the court of appeals had no choice
but to accept the retroactive rate-making issue for decision.138
The court of appeals' decision to decline jurisdiction over ex-
clusive ESA claims was proper. Congress granted the TECA exclu-
sive jurisdiction to ensure speedy and consistent resolution of legal
issues which, if left to review by the individual circuits, might have
produced uncertainty and delay as well as disruption of the na-
tion's economy. However, the TECA's exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion over FPC claims would have accorded with the intent of Con-
gress. Resolution of these allegedly pendent issues would have
been accomplished by a court of equal dignity and expertise. More-
over, in a case in which the issues are not cleanly severable, sepa-
rate review could produce chaos if the two courts disagree on a
single issue having multiple facets. Even in a case with cleanly sev-
erable issues, separate review can be wasteful of limited judicial
resources. Approval of the rate increase by the TECA, for example,
would be uneconomical if the court of appeals disapproved the in-
crease on other grounds.
The TECA's decision not to hear the rate-making claim, how-
ever, can be supported as a wise exercise of discretion. The TECA
has been given a limited jurisdiction so that its judges, who already
have full time duties on the courts of appeals, may decide special
cases with dispatch. These judges must jealously guard against en-
croachment upon their severely limited resources. Although it
might be convenient to the parties in a dispute to have a single
"case" decided at one time, to do so might prejudice resolution of
other cases that unquestionably are entirely within the jurisdiction
of the TECA. The TECA also need not concern itself with encour-
aging the parties to resort to that forum. This rationale for the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction has no application when the par-
136. Connecticut Mut. Group v. FPC, 498 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 998.
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ties must have their ESA claims reviewed by the TECA.
The Court in Hagans 13 had indicated a similar attitude, stat-
ing that it was a wise use of discretion for the three judge court not
to consider the pendent statutory claim, but to allow the single
judge to determine the merits of that claim. With the limited re-
sources of the federal judiciary, decisionmaking by one judge
rather than three was more economical. 40
Denton v. Schlesinger'4 ' exemplifies a recurring setting 4 2 in
which a court declines to use pendent jurisdiction to circumvent a
federal court's exclusive jurisdiction. The plaintiff military officers
in Denton sought injunctive relief in the district court to reinstate
themselves into the military service. To their claims for equitable
relief, they asserted pendent claims for back pay, each seeking
more than $10,000. Because the Court of Claims has exclusive ju-
risdiction over non-tort claims against the government in excess of
$10,000,143 the Ninth Circuit refused to exercise jurisdiction over
the pendent claims.'" In addition, the Court of Claims had the
power to grant the special injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs, 45
139. See notes 96-104 supra.
140. See generally Powell v. United States, 300 U.S. 276 (1937); New York Cent. Sec.
Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co. v. United States,
281 U.S. 479 (1930). All of these cases refused to assert jurisdiction over claims related to
claims for review of orders made by the ICC, the latter claims being reviewable by three
judge courts. The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924), had approved just such re-
view and appears indistinguishable from the cases cited earlier. Although the cases subse-
quent to Chicago Junction spoke in terms of a lack of power, they probably represent a
realization that three judge review for all aspects of a case requires too great a commitment
of judicial resources. In these cases however, no statutory mechanism provided for the single
judge review possible in Hagans. There is an extended discussion of this question in Kur-
land, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 817,
841-45 (1960).
141. 605 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1979).
142. See, e.g., Giordano v. Roudebush, 617 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1980); Cook v. Arentzen,
582 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1978); Polos v. United States, 556 F.2d 903 (8th Cir. 1977); Whelan v.
Brinegar, 538 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1976); Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969);
Larsen v. Hoffman, 444 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1977). See also Drennan v. Harris, 606 F.2d
846 (9th Cir. 1979). Cf. Ware v. United States, 626 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1980) (doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction may not be used to assert jurisdiction over Tucker Act claim of
$331,607.89 when waiver of sovereign immunity is expressly conditioned on an amount in
controversy of $10,000 or less).
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
144. See also United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940);
Nassau Smelting & Refining Works Ltd. v. United States, 266 U.S. 101 (1924); Note, Devel-
opments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HAnv. L.
Rav. 827, 928-31 (1957).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II 1978) (allows the Court of Claims, which lacks general
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thus making disposition of the claims by that tribunal particularly
desirable.1 4 6
Cases involving nonremovable claims, the functional
equivalent of claims within exclusive jurisdiction, reach similar re-
sults. In Gamble v. Central of Georgia Railway,14 7 the widow of a
deceased railroad worker brought a Federal Employer's Liability
Act (FELA) claim1 4 against the employer railroad company in
state court. By statute, such claims are not removable. 9 The de-
fendant railroad then brought an indemnity claim against the
property owner on whose land the fatal injury occurred. The rail-
road and property owner were of diverse citizenship. The property
owner sought removal of the entire case to a federal court, relying
on 28 U.S.C. section 1441(c), which permits removal of an entire
case so long as a removable claim is "separate and independent"
from a nonremovable claim. Although the claims were "separate
and independent" within the narrow meaning of the removal stat-
ute, these claims also arose out of a common nucleus of operative
fact. Examining the FELA legislative history in some detail, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that FELA claims originally brought in
state court could never be removed, notwithstanding section
1441(c). 150 Congress intended the plaintiff to have the sole choice
of forum; no notions of convenience, even those expressed in a
statute of seemingly general application to nonremovable causes of
action, could countermand that legislative direction.151
equitable powers, to restore offices and correct records). Analogously, review of deportation
orders is vested exclusively in the court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976). Review of a
ruling related to the deportation order will not vest a district court with pendent jurisdic-
tion over the deportation order. Lefson v. Esperdy, 211 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The
courts have been reluctant to declare that a deportation order will allow a court of appeals
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a related ruling. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 392 U.S. 206 (1968); Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375
U.S. 217, 227 n.14 (1963); Martinez de Mendoza v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 567
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1977); Lad v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 539 F.2d 808 (lst Cir.
1976); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the
Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 35 & n.127 (1975).
146. See A.L. Rowan & Son, General Contractors, Inc. v. HUD, 611 F.2d 997, 1000-01
(5th Cir. 1980).
147. 486 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
148. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1976). Cf. Banc Ohio Corp. v. Fox, 516 F.2d 29 (6th Cir.
1975) (no removal jurisdiction over Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 claim, even when
the parties are also diverse).
150. 486 F.2d at 785.
151. The Fifth Circuit noted that the lower court might retain jurisdiction over the
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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Given the importance attached to the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, a federal court should not exercise pendent juris-
diction over a claim for which administrative remedies have not
been exhausted. In Humana of South Carolina, Inc. v. Califano,15 2
the plaintiff, a proprietary hospital providing medicare services to
some of its patients, objected to federal regulations establishing
the rate of return on the supplier's equity that could be recovered
as a reasonable cost for medicare services. The plaintiff com-
plained that these regulations improperly deprived the hospital of
deserved compensation from 1966, when the regulations were first
promulgated, until and beyond the date of filing in 1975. It was
clear that all claims arising after 1973 must undergo administrative
review in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. "
Until the administrative remedies were exhausted, these claims
were barred from the district court."" The plaintiff contended,
however, that the federal courts had jurisdiction to consider his
pre-1973 claims, and should as a matter of convenience review his
entire case, including post-1973 claims.
The court rejected that argument, finding that Congress in-
tended to foreclose review by the courts until the administrative
review had been completed, even when the administrative review
third-party claim. Id. at 785. Hages v. Aliquippa & S. R.R., 427 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Pa.
1977), however, involved a somewhat different factual situation and produced a different
result. The plaintiff in Hages sued his employer in state court under the FELA and for
breach of contract. The parties were diverse, and on the basis of this diversity the defendant
successfully removed. The court reasoned that, when the employee joined separate and in-
dependent claims with his FELA claims, he had fair notice from § 1441 that his FELA claim
would be removed. Id. at 891-92. If he had desired to retain state court jurisdiction, he
should have abstained from joinder of his claims.
A similar rationale was employed in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148
(1976), in which the Court disapproved venue in a multiparty securities law case because
one of the defendants, a national bank, was not sued in its home district as required by 12
U.S.C. § 94 (1976). Because § 94 places exclusive venue in such a district, the Court appar-
ently refused to attach any significance to the venue requirements for claims against the
other parties which arose out of a common nucleus of operative fact. For a general discus-
sion, see Note, Ancillary Process and Venue in Federal Courts, 73 HARv. L. Rsv. 1164
(1960).
152. 590 F.2d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 ff (1976).
154. Id. Accord, Lodi Memorial Hosp. v. Califano, 451 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1978). See
also Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d
Cir. 1980).
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was unlikely to give the plaintiff relief. 1 5 Thus, the federal court
had no jurisdiction to consider the post-1973 claims, even under a
theory of pendent jurisdiction. Moreover, the court of appeals di-
rected the lower court to retain the pre-1973 claims, but to stay
consideration of those claims until the administrative process had
been completed for post-1973 claims. 5 ' The statutory demand for
administrative review not only foreclosed pendent jurisdiction, but
also affected the jurisdictionally sufficient claim that was not di-
rectly subject to administrative review.157
Similarly, in West v. United States55 the plaintiffs brought a
diversity action against medical equipment suppliers for injury to
their son. The defendants brought a third-party action against the
boy's doctor. The doctor was an employee of the United States
Public Health Service, which was substituted as a third-party de-
fendant. The plaintiffs consequently sought to implead the United
States as a third-party defendant, but failed to file an administra-
tive claim with the Public Health Service, a prerequisite to suing
the federal government.8 9 Specifically relying on Kroger, the court
held that this failure deprived the court of jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claim against the government and could not be cured by
the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. 60
Forms of Relief
Although the concept of jurisdiction normally is restricted to
the question of power to hear a case, several courts have construed
jurisdiction to include the power to grant a particular form of re-
lief." 1l Because this interpretation of the term "jurisdiction" has
thus far received only limited acceptance, few cases have employed
pendent jurisdiction to provide an otherwise unavailable remedy.
155. 590 F.2d at 1078.
156. Id. at 1085. But see Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear
Reactor, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980).
157. The Court's subsequent decision in Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), is
consistent with the analysis in Humana. The court in Yamasaki approved class relief only
for those members of the class who met the exhaustion requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1976). 442 U.S. at 704, 706. A pendent jurisdiction analysis would have supported the argu-
ment that only the named representatives of the class need have exhausted remedies. See
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
158. 592 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1979).
159. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (1976).
160. 592 F.2d at 491-92.
161. See Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 276-79 (1924).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
In Florida Medical Association, Inc. v. HEW,6 2 the Fifth Cir-
cuit refused to use pendent jurisdiction to circumvent detailed
statutory requirements for a grant of injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
had obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent publication
of a list of medicare payments made to its members. After ex-
tending the order, the district court entered "an ancillary writ of
injunction," even though it did not make the determinations neces-
sary to support a preliminary injunction.116 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, noting that pendent jurisdiction contemplates two sepa-
rate, but related, claims. In this case, the plaintiffs had only one
claim, for which the lower court granted a remedy unknown to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The federal courts cannot em-
ploy pendent jurisdiction to "abandon the Rules whenever they
prove procedurally inconvenient."' ' Otherwise, federal courts
might "promulgate an ad hoc procedural code whenever compli-
ance with the Rules proves inconvenient." 165
In Jaffee v. United States,"'6 the plaintiff brought a class ac-
tion on behalf of all soldiers who had been ordered to witness an
atomic blast in 1953. He sought an injunction to compel the gov-
ernment to warn and provide medical care for the soldiers. In addi-
tion, he sought money damages for himself. The trial court dis-
missed the class action claim, and the plaintiff sought interlocutory
review.
On review, the Third Circuit found the request for a medical
warning to be truly injunctive in nature and the valid subject of an
interlocutory appeal.167 Insofar as the request sought medical
treatment, however, it also encompassed a claim for damages, for
which an interlocutory appeal normally is not available.6 8 None-
162. 601 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979).
163. Florida Medical Ass'n v. HEW, 454 F. Supp. 326, 335 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
164. 601 F.2d at 202.
165. Id. For examples in which a loose conception of pendent jurisdiction to grant
remedies was found harmless, see Michigan Head Start Directors Ass'n v. Butz, 397 F.
Supp. 1124 (W.D. Mich. 1975); Kois v. Breier, 312 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Wis. 1970). Courts have
granted "ancillary remedies" for violations of the federal securities laws, but these remedies
are ancillary only in the sense that they are not explicitly authorized by statute. They are,
however, consistent with the general equity powers of the federal courts. See SEC v. Beis-
inger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1977); SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F.
Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits,
89 HIRv. L. RE. 1779 (1976).
166. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
168. For exceptions to this rule, see id. § 1291.
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theless, because the court had appellate jurisdiction over part of
the order, the court held it could consider the whole,169 a ruling
inconsistent with Abney v. United States.170
On the merits, the court approved an injunction to warn en-
dangered members of the class because the Administrative Proce-
dure Act1 71 waived sovereign immunity for relief other than dam-
ages.1 2 The court did not grant monetary damages, however,
because "this reading of the statute would imply a waiver of sover-
eign immunity in damage suits whenever a plaintiff could append
equitable relief to his monetary claims. That result would conflict
with... Congresional intent .... ,,17 The court thus gave effect
to Congress' carefully formulated plans to give equitable relief, but
to deny claims for money damages.174 Because the government had
immunity from such a claim,17 5 pendent jurisdiction could not
pierce the immunity;176 the convenience and fairness to the parties
that might result from consolidated disposition of related claims
should not confer a form of relief that the plaintiff could never
receive, either in the district court or in the Court of Claims.
169. 592 F.2d at 715.
170. See notes 112-14 & accompanying text supra.
171. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
172. 592 F.2d at 719. Accord, Sheenan v. AAFES, 619 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980). But
see Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1978).
173. 592 F.2d at 719.
174. A converse situation arises when the Court of Claims is asked to give equitable
relief. The Court of Claims may employ principles derived from equity, but it may not give
equitable relief. See Alabama Hosp. Ass'n v. Califano, 587 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1979). The
recent grant of authority to the Court of Claims to correct records, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp.
H 1978), only emphasizes the jurisdictional limitations that Congress has imposed on the
power to grant equitable relief that even pendent jurisdiction cannot circumvent.
175. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
176. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d 1335 (Ct. CL 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1599 (1980).
177. Federal courts have often disclaimed a full range of equitable powers for them-
selves when they sit "in admiralty." See, e.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana
Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950). It is unclear whether a party might characterize a claim for
equitable relief as pendent or ancillary to an admiralty claim. See Beverly Hills Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Compania De Navegacione Almirante S.A., 437 F.2d 301 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 996 (1971) (pendent equitable claim arising under state law). For a com-
prehensive survey and analysis of the authorities, see Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and
Jurisdiction after the 1966 Unification, 74 MicH. L. Ray. 1628, 1637-45, 1659-63 (1977). If
Congress had ever expressed approval of this self denial, pendent jurisdiction would be in-
appropriate. In any event, the courts may be in the process of asserting full equity powers
and thereby rendering the propriety of pendent jurisdiction irrelevant. See Pino v. Protec-
tion Maritime Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1979).
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court's suggestion in Romero unleashed the pos-
sibility of pendent jurisdiction over federal law claims. This sug-
gestion has reached full realization in cases that circumvent the
amount in controversy requirement to avoid decision of constitu-
tional issues. If Congress should ever amend section 1331 to dis-
pense entirely-with a jurisdictional amount,17 8 it would remove the
principal occasion for the use of the doctrine. In almost all other
cases, pendent jurisdiction over federal law claims has been re-
jected, and rightfully so. Convenience, efficiency, and fairness to
the parties are attractive goals. When, however, Congress has im-
posed special jurisdictional requirements on the federal courts, the
judiciary should be reluctant to upset the more particularized goals
that have displaced the general goals found in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Romero has generated and will continue to gener-
ate controversies better left unopened. Congressional limitations
on the jurisdictional power of the federal courts caution against the
unwarranted expansion of the doctrine to encompass claims arising
under federal law.
178. The present version of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) requires no amount in contro-
versy in an action against a federal defendant, ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BzawEEN STATE AND FMmuL COURTS § 1311 (April 1964 Draft) would eliminate the amount
in controversy requirement in all federal question cases.
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